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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Affirming the trial court's decision would effectively elimi-
nate the statute of frauds as it applies to leases and overrule a 
number of Utah cases. Furthermore, the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel would be modified by significantly minimizing the require-
ment of reasonable reliance and substantially expanding damages 
available for promissory estoppel claims. Affirming the trial 
court's decision would allow anyone who is unable ultimately to 
consummate a contract to sue the other party after negotiations fail 
and claim he relied upon the hope of a contract. The impact on 
commercial transactions in Utah would be far reaching since the 
trial court's ruling effectively eviscerates the statute of frauds, 
the solemnity of written contracts, and the requirements of 
contractual offer and acceptance. 
Even given Stangl's version of the facts, the material facts 
remain the same. Stangl told Ernst he owned the property and never 
corrected that misconception; he never told Ernst he was buying the 
property; he never signed any documents with Ernst; and he voluntar-
ily held the property for 2 1/2 years after negotiations ended. 
Those facts are insufficient to overcome the statute of frauds and 
to create promissory estoppel with damages representing 2 1/2 years' 
worth of consequential damages. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT BE ELIMINATED IN 
THE AREA OF AGREEMENTS TO LEASE REAL PROPERTY. 
Agreements to lease real property for more than one year or an 
agreement to lease an interest in land must be in writing to be 
enforceable. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1). An oral 
agreement to make a contract is also within the statute of frauds. 
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986). Applying 
these basic principles, the trial court properly found there could 
be no contractual recovery because of the statute of frauds. 
Nevertheless, it applied promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of 
frauds.1 Stangl tries to ignore the fact that upholding this deci-
sion would overrule at least three Utah Supreme Court decisions: 
McKinnon v. The Corp. of the Pres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974), Easton v. Wycoff. 
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (Utah 1956), and Ravarino v. Price, 
123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953). Stangl claims these old 
*Stangl argues for the first time on appeal that there were two 
promissory estoppel claims, one for breach of contract and one 
"that did not depend on the existence of a binding contract." 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 22, n.ll). Neither the Complaint nor the 
Trial Briefs, nor even the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ever suggested there were two separate promissory estoppel causes 
of action. Furthermore, the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decision states that the "promise" was the 
August 2, 1988 telephone call that led Stangl to believe a lease 
would be completed. Stangl claims Ernst promised it would lease 
the property and failed to do so, thus damaging him. Trying to 
divide the claim or create an imaginary "second" promissory 
estoppel claim is useless; the lawsuit still boils down to a claim 
that Ernst failed to lease the property. Therefore, it is an 
alleged "promise" governed by the statute of frauds. 
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cases involved a narrower form of promissory estoppel and urges this 
Court to ignore Utah Supreme Court precedent and rely instead on the 
decision in a federal district court case, Medesco v. LNS Int'l. 
762 F. Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991). 
Stangl implicitly acknowledges that this Court would effec-
tively be overruling Utah Supreme Court precedent by upholding the 
decision below. The court in Ravarino squarely held that an oral 
agreement to convey two tracts of land could not be enforced by the 
use of promissory estoppel: 
[W]e conclude the general rule applies that an estoppel 
will not arise simply because of a breach of a promise as 
to future conduct or because of a disappointment of expec-
tations on an executory agreement. 
Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 577. 
The court in Easton specifically held: 
The mere refusal to execute a written contract as agreed 
does not constitute "fraud" within the rule that the 
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where the effect 
would be to perpetrate a fraud and to hold otherwise would, 
in effect, completely nullify the Statute of Frauds. 
Easton, 295 P.2d at 333. 
Finally, in McKinnon, the court held: 
However, a mere promise to execute a written contract and 
a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an 
estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and 
damage is sustained as a consequence of the refusal. 
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436-437. 
The trial court's holding that Stangl could use promissory 
estoppel to obtain damages from Ernst for an alleged promise to 
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execute a lease directly contradicts McKinnon. Easton, and Ravarino. 
Pursuant to SCM Land Co. . supra. that alleged promise falls within 
the Utah statute of frauds. Just as stated in these cases, it was an 
alleged "promise to execute a written contract" or "disappointment of 
expectations on an executory agreement." 
Recognizing his dilemma, Stangl claims that McKinnon, Easton. 
and Ravarino involved a different type of promissory estoppel theory. 
Nonetheless, he cannot escape the fact that the statute of frauds 
would be nullified by the trial court's holding because one party 
could always claim there was an oral promise and sue. Stangl's 
argument that different promissory estoppel law should apply would 
only be relevant if this case presented a circumstance where 
promissory estoppel could actually be used. Expansion of the theory 
of promissory estoppel is irrelevant to whether the statute of frauds 
will be ignored. Until the legislature changes the statute of frauds 
as it applies to leases or the Utah Supreme Court overrules a 
substantial body of law consisting of McKinnon. Ravarino. Easton. and 
others, expansion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot 
nullify Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1). 
Stangl also attempts to sidestep these cases by claiming he is 
only asking for damages as a consequence of the promise and not for 
enforcement of the lease itself. This new proposition contradicts 
Stangl's theory at trial and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law he drafted, specifically Conclusion of Law No. 10, which says: 
-4-
"Injustice can only be avoided in this case by enforcing Ernst's 
promise to lease the anchor space under promissory estoppel." This 
new request for relief also ignores the Utah cases holding there must 
be a requirement of a writing for subject matter covered by the 
statute of frauds. Stangl claims that a mere "agreement to agree" 
entitles him to damages. The Utah Supreme Court rejected such 
contentions in Engineering Ass'n.. Inc. v. Irving Place Ass'n.. Inc.. 
622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980) and in Harmen v. Greenwood. 596 P.2d 636 
(Utah 1979) .2 In none of these Utah cases were damages allowed, 
regardless of whether the requested relief was specific performance 
or consequential damages. As the McKinnon court stated: 
A mere promise to execute a written contract and subsequent 
refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estoppel 
although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is 
sustained as a consequence of the refusal.3 
2These cases involved signed letters where there was absolutely 
no dispute as to the "alleged promise." By contrast, in the present 
case the parties never signed any letter of intent; the alleged 
promise consists of a telephone message left with a receptionist 
stating the project had been approved and a letter of intent would 
be forthcoming. (See. Finding of Fact No. 26.) 
3Stangl also tries to claim that McKinnon may impliedly allow 
promissory estoppel to be used in a statute of frauds case by 
emphasizing an excerpt from this case. (Brief of Appellee, p. 23, 
n.12.) Importantly, the court in McKinnon goes on to state that 
"the promise as to future conduct constituted an intended abandon-
ment of an existing right of the promisor." Nothing could be 
further from the truth in this case given that all the letters of 
intent exchanged (although never signed) provided any obligation 
would be subject to a signed lease agreement executed by the 
parties. Nor is there any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law 
that Ernst "intended abandonment of an existing right." Thus, 
promissory estoppel to circumvent the statute of frauds is 
fruitless here. 
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Stangl is ultimately reduced to claiming that Medesco is better 
reasoned and that this Court should somehow overrule Utah Supreme 
Court precedent. Medesco was decided on a summary judgment motion; 
therefore, we do not have the benefit of the rather narrow formu-
lation of Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 139, as it applied to 
actual facts after a trial such as in this case. It is hard to 
believe damages would be awarded after the parties exchanged letters 
of intent, which neither party signed; lease negotiations continued 
with multiple versions exchanged; and, ultimately, lease negotiations 
broke off. Unlike the plaintiff in Medesco. Stangl secretly bought 
a piece of property, after advising Ernst that he already owned it, 
and was awarded damages for 2 1/2 years. Upholding the trial court's 
decision would allow frustrated negotiators to claim promissory 
estoppel and seek damages for money spent in "anticipation" of a 
possible contract, even if the other side was unaware of the 
expenditures at the time. Stangl's use of Medesco is suspect, given 
the summary judgment context of Medesco compared to the trial and 
result in this case. This is not the case for trumping the statute 
of frauds and adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 139.4 
4For reasons stated in Ernst's Opening Brief, other courts have 
refused to adopt § 13 9 in the face of specific statutory enactments 
such as Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1) even though courts 
adopted the expanded version of Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
§ 90. 
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Although courts in other jurisdictions have created limited 
exceptions to allow promissory estoppel recovery despite the statute 
of frauds, none of those exceptions supports the decision in this 
case. Stangl is not claiming that there should be a limited excep-
tion, but argues to this court that it must completely adopt § 139 
and overrule the earlier Utah cases. Presumably, this is because 
Stangl recognizes that none of the exceptions from other juris-
dictions will help him. 
A. Alleged Promises Made in Contract Negotiations Cannot Revive 
a Rejected Offer. 
Stangl tries linguistic legerdemain to claim on appeal he really 
had two promissory estoppel cases to avoid the statute of frauds and 
also tries to claim that promissory estoppel can now be used in Utah 
in contract negotiations. To do so would require this Court to 
overrule R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 
(Utah 1952) . Stangl tries to distinguish Daum by claiming it was a 
construction case and therefore should not apply. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Daum specifically stated: 
We know of no case where an offeror has been held to be 
bound by estoppel without an acceptance of his offer. 
Daum, at 208. 
The Daum decision makes sense. When parties are negotiating but 
ultimately do not reach an agreement, one party should not be allowed 
to revive the negotiations and claim that damages were sustained as 
a result of promissory estoppel applied to contract negotiations. 
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In the unpublished decision of Triax Pacific Inc. v. American 
Ins. Co•. No. 94-8091, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097 (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 
1995) (copy attached as Appendix A), the court held that any promises 
made were part of preliminary contract negotiations and could not 
form the basis for promissory estoppel. The court found the defen-
dants would not reasonably expect any action or forbearance until a 
written contract was consummated.5 In the present case, all letters 
of intent exchanged contained a provision that there was no binding 
agreement between the parties until a lease had been executed by all 
parties. The letters of intent sent by Stangl said this also. The 
written record of the correspondence reinforces the expectation set 
by the law that there is no obligation until a ''written contract is 
consummated." 
The uncontroverted facts in this case and admitted exhibits 
prove negotiations were ongoing; Stangl is trying to enforce an 
alleged promise supposedly made in the midst of negotiations. Stangl 
cannot avoid the facts as shown by the documents. A more complete 
recital is set forth in Ernst's Opening Brief, but a summary follows: 
June 3, 1988 - Stangl's agent, Pruitt, sends a letter 
stating that Stangl was interested in leasing space in the 
plaza to Ernst. 
5Although the Triax Pacific Inc. decision is not precedent, 
pursuant to the court's General Order found at 151 FRD 470 
(Appendix B), it may be cited where it would assist a court in its 
disposition. 
-8-
June 23, 1988 - Stangl's agent sends Ernst a letter setting 
forth the general terms of a lease and asking Ernst to 
sign. It was not signed. 
June 29, 1988 - Ernst responds, identifying areas of 
disagreement. 
July 8, 1988 - Ernst sends a letter of intent asking that 
it be signed but conditioning the letter of intent upon 
execution of a lease agreement. 
July 14, 1988 - Stangl counters with his own offer to lease 
including the same language about lease approval and asks 
Ernst to sign it. It was left unsigned. 
August 2, 1988 - Ernst calls Stangl's agent and leaves a 
message saying that the project was approved and another 
offer to lease would be forthcoming. 
August 5, 1988 - Stangl sends Ernst's form lease with 
substantial changes. 
August 23, 1988 - Ernst sends back a revised lease to 
Stangl. 
August 29, 1988 - Stangl sends back a letter and draft 
lease with over 44 changes. The marked up lease includes 
changes on almost every page. 
September 12, 1988 - Ernst sends Stangl a letter saying the 
negotiations will terminate absent resolution of 
significant remaining issues. 
September 14, 1988 - The parties hold a meeting after which 
at least five open issues were left unresolved. 
Even Stangl must agree with the above recital because it is all 
documented. The letters, the leases, and his notations on documents 
are clear.6 
6Stangl tries to escape the consequences of not having accepted 
an offer and not having agreed to the terms by claiming that he 
would have ultimately accepted and the five remaining issues were 
not very important to him. Nonetheless, he expressly acknowledges 
that there were five open issues and therefore no agreement. The 
trial court also found this in denying the contract claim. (See, 
Court's Memorandum of Decision dated April 20, 1993). 
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Stangl claims, and the trial court apparently found, that the 
August 2, 1988 telephone message that the project was approved and 
another offer to lease would be forthcoming, constituted a "promise." 
The uncontroverted chronology of lease negotiations shows that at 
least twice thereafter, Stangl rejected Ernst's offers and counter-
offered attempting to get a better deal. 
Promissory estoppel was never meant to apply to this type of 
situation. The trial court's decision, if affirmed, would expose 
every contract negotiator in Utah to a claim for promissory estoppel 
when any negotiations terminate. The cases cited by Stangl and 
recent Utah cases applying promissory estoppel such as Andreason v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) address 
promissory estoppel outside of the contract arena. This is particu-
larly the case where the alleged promises are subsequently rejected 
by the party trying to enforce the promise at trial. Promissory 
estoppel simply cannot be used to displace contractual concepts of 
offer and acceptance. 
From a public policy standpoint, there are good reasons for 
this. When parties are negotiating before entering a written docu-
ment, by definition there is no agreement yet. In essence, every 
offer and counteroffer could be retroactively converted into an 
enforceable promise regardless of the statute of frauds or contract 
principles of offer and acceptance. When people negotiate, they 
assume that they will have no liability until they reach an 
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agreement. Affirming the trial court's decision would create a whole 
new dimension of claims unbounded by any requirements normally 
expected by reasonable people. 
B. Promissory Estoppel Cannot Be Found Without Reasonable 
Reliance. 
Stangl claims he proved the necessary elements of promissory 
estoppel and reasonably relied by purchasing the shopping center. 
Stangl repeatedly argues that all parties believed the lease negotia-
tions were on a "fast track basis." Fast track negotiations do not 
amount to an understanding that Stangl was purchasing the property. 
Instead, the necessary prerequisites for promissory estoppel are a 
promise which is "sufficiently definite and certain that the 
plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances, would be justified in placing reliance upon it." 
Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp.. 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 35-36 
(Utah 1965) . No matter how vigorously Stangl repeats throughout his 
brief that the negotiations were on a fast track basis, it cannot 
make the alleged promise definite and certain and cannot make the 
purchase of a shopping center reasonable when Stangl failed to advise 
Ernst he was doing so. 
Stangl admitted at trial that he never told Ernst: 
• The June 3, 1988 letter which said he was acquiring the property 
by the end of June was wrong; 
• He was taking action to acquire title to the property; 
• He had entered into an option agreement to buy the property; 
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• He was going to purchase Aetna's note; 
• He borrowed money from the bank to buy the property; and 
• When he was closing on the purchase. 
Trying to concoct reliance in the face of these concessions, 
Stangl also argues that because Ernst sent financial statements to 
him, Ernst must have assumed that he was buying the property. To the 
contrary, the parties had discussed the need for improvements to the 
location and in fact, Ernst was spending its own money on architects. 
The financial statements were for Stangl to use for obtaining 
financing, but Stangl's own admissions acknowledge he never told 
Ernst it was for purchase of the property. 
Stangl cites Mahoney v. McDonald's Corporation, 770 F.2d 123 
(8th Cir. 1985). (Brief of Appellee, pp. 42-43). This is remarkable 
due to the marked differences between the conduct of Dr. Mahoney (a 
doctor in Missouri) and Mr. Stangl (a real estate developer in Utah 
for over thirty years whose net 1988 net worth was approximately 
$24 million). Dr. Mahoney expressly communicated to McDonald's prior 
to purchasing the property that he was going to buy the property and 
wanted to make sure that a lease was going to be sent back. He sent 
McDonald's a copy of the option agreement for the land. Furthermore, 
Dr. Mahoney had already signed the lease and sent it to McDonald's. 
McDonald's prepared the lease and already approved it but for a 
signature. McDonald's real estate agent said, "We have a deal." In 
this case, Stangl admits he never sent the option agreement to Ernst. 
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He never told Ernst he was closing on the property or taking steps to 
acquire title. To the contrary of the Mahoney case, Ernst's letter 
said: 
Since we have several issues unresolved and have the 
possibility of terminating the negotiations if the 
significant issues can not be settled, we have not 
redrafted the Lease as you requested. 
(September 12, 1988 letter, Addendum K to Brief of Appellant.) 
Stangl contends that his purchase occurred after the alleged 
"promise" on August 2, 1988.7 However, his sworn discovery responses, 
which he signed on October 5, 1989, state: 
Believing that a binding lease agreement was in place, 
Stangl exercised his option to purchase the property on 
July 28, 1988. 
Answers to Interrogatories, No. 38. (Attached to Brief of Appellee 
as last page of Exhibit A to Exhibit N.) 
Stangl's sworn interrogatory responses reveal his position in 
1989 that he believed Ernst had "promised" by virtue of sending an 
unsigned, unexecuted letter of intent and that he acted on July 28, 
1988. His efforts at trial and on appeal to change all this to 
actions after August 2, 1988 are nothing short of remarkable. Such 
attempts are inconsistent with Stangl's own sworn interrogatory 
responses, his letters and the actual events. 
7For example, even though Stangl's loan application to Valley 
Mortgage acknowledged that he would have to pay back taxes on the 
property, he tries to claim that the taxes were something new and 
he could have withdrawn from the closing. He also ignores his own 
letters and those of his own attorneys which indicate that all 
material items were done prior to August 2, 1988 for the purchase. 
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The Mahoney case supports the finding of promissory estoppel in 
an entirely different context. In his brief, Stangl agrees Mahoney 
should be followed. If an ordinary and reasonably prudent person 
such as Dr. Mahoney can make sure that McDonald's knows beforehand he 
is going to take a decisive and expensive step such as acquiring the 
piece of property, an admitted sophisticated real estate developer 
for over thirty years who owned over 1.5 million square feet of 
leasable space could have ensured that Ernst knew he was buying the 
property in reliance. The uncontroverted facts and Stangl's own 
admissions and testimony (whether one believes his interrogatory 
responses or his trial testimony), establish that there was no 
reasonable reliance. 
Utah case law requires that in order to be liable, the promisor 
be "aware of all material facts" and know the promise will induce 
specific action in reliance upon the promise. Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993); Union Tank 
Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1964) . 
Additionally, the promise must be one which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action. Ernst had been advised in June 
1988 that Stangl would own the property by the end of June. (R. 34 98-
500.) In July, Stangl submitted documents to the City of West Jordan 
in which he inaccurately listed himself as the property owner. 
(R. 3789-90; Exhibits 7, 19.) Stangl admitted he never corrected 
this falsehood. (R. 3778.) Reliance upon a representation one knows 
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is untrue is not reasonable, so the "reasonable reliance" intent of 
promissory estoppel is not present. 
Utah promissory estoppel law and even the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts. § 13 9 further require that the promise induced action 
which was foreseeable. Stangl's expenditures in the wake of his own 
unequivocal representations to Ernst that he would not agree to 
material terms of the lease were unforeseeable. In fact, he never 
bothered to apprise Ernst of his expenditures at the time. If such 
unexpected and unannounced actions are viewed as foreseeable, parties 
to unsuccessful negotiations will always have an incentive to bring 
a promissory estoppel claim. For example, if two parties are nego-
tiating for a supply contract of widgets and the potential purchaser 
decides the price is too high and does not want to enter into the 
contract, the seller could sue, claiming he purchased a widget plant 
in reliance upon a promise that the negotiations would conclude 
satisfactorily. Affirming the trial court's decision could also 
affect everyday real estate transactions. Buyer and seller are nego-
tiating for the purchase of a residence. Buyer, thinking that he can 
eventually get the seller down to his price, purchases a $10,000 hot 
tub without telling the seller because he does not want to show any 
weakness in negotiations. If the seller refuses to drop his price 
and sells to another party, the frustrated buyer could sue under a 
promissory estoppel theory and demand reimbursement for the hot tub. 
Affirming this decision could result in these and many more expanded 
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applications in contravention of the statute of frauds and 
established promissory estoppel law in Utah. 
C. Damages Cannot Be Awarded Pursuant to Promissory Estoppel 
for Voluntary Choices Made Two and One-Half Years After the 
Alleged Breach of Promise. 
The alleged promise occurred August 2, 1988. Ernst terminated 
the contract negotiations on September 29, 1988. Stangl sold the 
property in March 1991. Between the time that he acquired the 
property and September 29, 1988, Stangl had only spent $7,380.59 in 
onsite improvements at the Jordan Valley Plaza. (Exhibit 88A(a).) 
During the next 2 1/2 years, Stangl claims that he incurred addi-
tional costs of over $880,000.00. The trial court awarded Stangl 
damages so that he would be made entirely whole from his purchase of 
the Jordan Valley Plaza to the time that he sold it 2 1/2 years 
later.8 
Once again, Mahoney is illustrative. Stangl agrees that Mahoney 
applies to this appeal. In Mahoney, although the court found under 
the unique facts of that case that promissory estoppel was appro-
priate, the appellate court reversed on the methodology of damages 
used by the trial court, noting that damages in promissory estoppel 
cases: 
8For reasons discussed in Ernst's opening brief and hereafter, 
the trial court erred and over-compensated Stangl. However, for 
purposes of this section, the point is that the methodology is 
inconsistent with promissory estoppel law. 
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may be limited as justice requires. It would be unjust for 
Mahoney to hold the 109 building indefinitely while 
McDonald's paid interest on the purchase price. Instead, 
Mahoney was entitled to a reasonable time to sell the 
building or make alternative disposition of it. 
Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 128. The court further held that Mahoney's 
failure to sell the building must have been based on his decision 
that he could do better for himself by making an alternative disposi-
tion of the building. Therefore, Mahoney was no longer acting in 
reliance on the promise but on the basis of his own decision. The 
court held that Mahoney was entitled to five months' time actually 
spent in deciding how to dispose of the building under the facts of 
that case, but that: 
[S]ubsequent expenses are Mahoney's responsibility because 
they represent a calculated risk on his part to hold onto 
the building instead of selling it outright. 
Mahoney, 77 F.2d at 128. Mahoney is also interesting since Mahoney 
had two other contiguous buildings and perhaps thought he could do 
better by trying to find a package arrangement. Id. at 128, n.3. 
The same thing applies here. Stangl had two pads of property for 
which he had been unsuccessfully trying to get easements from Aetna 
prior to his acquisition of the property. When he eventually sold 
the property in 1991, he also sold the two pads as part of it which 
resulted in the creative accounting that constituted his numerous 
damage exhibits at trial. Stangl testified that he decided to keep 
the property and try to clean it up instead of selling it at the 
time. In Andreason, the court held that damages in promissory 
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estoppel claims are limited to only those sustained to a plaintiff's 
detriment in reasonable reliance. Andreason, supra. 848 P.2d at 175. 
Here, the trial court awarded unfettered damages. The trial court 
not only required Ernst to pay for all interest, carrying costs, 
expenses, employee costs, overhead expenses of Stangl Construction, 
taxes, etc., but also awarded damages for other loans and payoffs 
that Stangl had with the bank. All of this resulted in effectively 
awarding benefit of the bargain damages instead of promissory 
estoppel damages which "are limited as justice requires." 
D. Utah Trials Should Not Be Fishing Expeditions. 
The first part of this case was tried in February 1993. Stangl 
continually changed his damage exhibits in the middle of trial by 
bringing new versions each morning of trial and sometimes after the 
lunch recess. Ernst moved to exclude the new exhibits and new infor-
mation. The court denied that motion. That alone was prejudicial 
error. Ernst then moved to bifurcate. Implicitly acknowledging the 
problems with the damage exhibits and discovery abuses, the trial 
court granted the motion to bifurcate. Thereafter, Ernst again sent 
interrogatories asking that the documents and exhibits be supple-
mented. Notwithstanding this, he created new damage exhibits and 
delivered another $48,000.00 of checks Saturday evening before trial 
commenced on Tuesday morning in 1994. Amazingly, the trial court 
included this amount in the damage award to Stangl as well. A full 
chronology of this is set forth in Ernst's Objection to Introduction 
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of Evidence Not Produced in Discovery which was filed on February 23, 
1994 and is attached to this brief at Addendum C. (R. 2039-2081.) 
Stangl's response to this on appeal is curious: 
Stangl's out-of-pocket costs stem from numerous, compli-
cated financial transactions and it was necessary to review 
a substantial number of documents concerning those trans-
actions to actually calculate those costs. 
(Stangl's Brief of Appellee, p. 48, n.42.) Stangl admits these 
changes were made during trial. JEdL This sandbagging is precisely 
what pretrial discovery was meant to avoid; parties should have the 
documents and the calculations in advance of trial. In this case, 
Ernst submitted interrogatories in 1989 asking for production of all 
this information. Two more sets of interrogatories were subsequently 
delivered to Stangl. Finally, after the three versions of the 
damages exhibits at the 1993 trial, Ernst served a fourth set of 
discovery requests for information on damages. Stangl answered them 
by claiming that Ernst had everything. Nonetheless, on Saturday 
evening during trial Stangl provided a new exhibit and checks 
amounting to $48,333.43. It is inconsistent with the discovery rules 
to require a party to respond in the middle of trial to shifting 
sands. 
Stangl acknowledges these sands were shifting but attempts to 
avoid it by claiming that Ernst had the documents. Nonetheless, 
Stangl had to admit that the $48,000.00 worth of checks had never 
been provided. Stangl attempts to avoid this dilemma by claiming 
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that he told Ernst in his interrogatory responses that he had to pay 
interest, but that ignores the fact that interest was accruing on a 
variety of obligations, all of which were part of the "numerous, 
complicated financial transactions." Stangl simply cannot escape the 
fact that he did not produce many documents to Ernst which were 
produced during trial. Even the damages exhibits themselves should 
have been produced long before the middle of the trial--especially 
since the damages phase of trial was one year later. 
Furthermore, a detailed review of the exhibits demonstrates very 
clever and complicated assumptions made within the damage calcu-
lations. For example, vacancy rates on the pads of property, and 
therefore the values for the vacancy rates, sometimes appear and 
sometimes disappear in the exhibits. Out-of-pocket expenses simi-
larly change. Since these were all Stangl's documents and 
calculations, he was free to concoct the best version from the 
assumptions. This is far different than simply adding up numbers to 
come up with damages. Assumptions were contained within the damages 
exhibits relating to the value of the pads which should be deducted 
from the ultimate sale in 1991 and relating to tax treatment, 
depreciation and the like. By changing those calculations and 
exhibits in the midst of trial, Ernst was deprived of the ability to 
examine carefully the calculations so that it could effectively 
cross-examine the parties. Trial counsel for Ernst was handed a 
complicated multi-page damages exhibit just as the witness was taking 
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the stand, then immediately had to listen to the direct examination 
while simultaneously thinking about the impending cross-examination 
based on "surprise" exhibits and a "surprise" damages theory. This 
is precisely the reason for the discovery rules--so that trials are 
not explorations of "numerous, complicated financial transactions" 
which have been prepared by one side only to be shown to the other 
side during trial. Stangl's ambush trial tactics prejudiced Ernst. 
E. Claims of Ernst's Failure to Marshal the Evidence Will Not 
Salvage the Trial Court's Decision. 
Stangl devotes a substantial portion of his brief on appeal to 
his claim that Ernst failed to marshal the evidence. Ernst did 
marshal the evidence. Stangl attempts to deflect this Court's atten-
tion from the legal issues by uttering claims of failure to marshal 
evidence. Even giving Stangl the benefit of doubt on all the facts, 
errors of law were still made by the trial court in four areas: 
1. The application of promissory estoppel to eviscerate 
the statute of frauds, contrary to settled Utah precedent; 
2. The use of promissory estoppel to revive failed 
contract negotiations, contrary to Utah law; 
3. Application of promissory estoppel with regard to the 
purchase of the property, notwithstanding that Ernst did not know of 
all material facts since Stangl admitted at trial he never told Ernst 
that he was buying the property; and 
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4. The trial court's error of law in its remedy and 
methodology for arriving at damages. 
The above are errors of law, not fact. No matter how vigorously 
Stangl argues about marshaling the evidence, it is uncontroverted 
that the following points are true: 
1. Even though a number of letters of intent were 
exchanged which required the other party to sign (all of which 
provided that there was no binding agreement until a signed lease had 
been executed) , none of these documents were ever signed by both 
parties. 
2. Numerous offers and counteroffers, beginning in late 
June 1988 through September 14, 1988, occurred between the parties. 
3. No agreement was reached between the parties as of 
September 29, 1988 (as found by the trial court). 
4. Stangl acquired the property in early August 1988, the 
contract negotiations terminated September 29, 1988, and Stangl sold 
the property in March 1991. 
5. The methodology for damages included all money 
invested by Stangl on his secret purchase of the property and all 
money invested during the two and one-half years after the 
September 29, 1988 termination of negotiations minus what Stangl 
received when the property was purchased in March 1991. 
The above facts are undisputed and not subject to inter-
pretation. On the face of these facts, the decision cannot be 
-22-
affirmed without overruling Utah cases. The problems inherent in the 
trial court's decision in this case are not factual. They are errors 
of law in the application of the law to the facts, and in attempting 
to make new law for Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed. Utah law 
simply does not countenance a decision which effectively nullifies 
the statute of frauds and opens up all contract negotiations to 
claims of promissory estoppel. Solid Utah precedent has always 
followed common sense and held that the reason for the statute of 
frauds is to ensure that the parties know the details of the 
agreement. The trial court's decision holds Ernst liable for a 
surreptitious purchase of property for over $1 million. Utah 
precedent is clear that when parties are in the midst of contract 
negotiations which then terminate unsuccessfully, promissory 
estoppel cannot be used to revive those negotiations or to claim 
damages as a result. When promissory estoppel is alleged by a party, 
the Utah courts have always required the following elements to be 
proven: that the party being bound to the promise knew all material 
facts in making the promise, that the promisee reasonably relied, and 
that the damages are limited as justice requires. A sophisticated 
real estate developer like Stangl should not be entitled to purchase 
property without even advising the party he was negotiating with of 
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the purchase, then sue for those damages when his multiple 
counteroffers are unsuccessful. 
Even if the decision is not reversed outright, the case should 
be remanded for a new trial. Trial must be held on the liability 
issues and the multiple damage issues. Numerous errors were made in 
the computation and calculation of damages and in the methodology 
used. Stangl's own testimony and exhibits show he had only spent 
approximately $7,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenditures in reliance 
upon the alleged promise prior to the time Ernst terminated contract 
negotiations. However, the court awarded $331,391.00 in damages. 
This also included amounts that had never been produced to Ernst 
during trial (such as $48,333.43 of checks allegedly for interest 
paid to a private party). Ernst was never afforded the opportunity 
to examine the documents and computation of damages which no doubt 
led to the errors made by the trial court. At a minimum, this case 
should be remanded with the appropriate instructions for retrial. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097 
November 2, 1995, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS MAST LIMIT CTEATION TO 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO 
THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Tkble Caae 
Format at: 69E3d548,1995 US. App. LEXIS 37888. 
PRIOR HISTORY: ( D C No. 9O-CV-1036). 
JUDGES: Before BALDOCK, HOLLCWAY, and 
BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 
OIWIONBY: WILLIAM J. HOLLCWAY, JR, 
OPINION: ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
* This order and judgment is not binding prece-
dent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, 
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court gen-
erally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; 
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited un-
der the terms and conditions of the court's General 
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 EMX 470. 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this 
panel has determined unanimously mat oral argument 
would not materially assist the determination of this ap-
peal. See Fed. R. App. R 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral ar-
gument, nl 
nl We have considered the request for oral argu-
ment by plaintiff and find that argument would not 
be beneficial. 
[•2] 
Plaintiff Triax Pacific, lac. appeals from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants on all o7 plaintiffs breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel claims. W& affirm. 
I 
In late July or early August 1990, RG & B 
Contractors, Inc. defaulted on its contract with the 
Department of the Navy for renovation of 169 hous-
ing units on the island of Guam. R. at 60, 74, 122, 
164, 228. Defendants American Insurance Company 
and Fireman's Fund were RG & B's sureties on the 
Navy contract. n2 Id. at 1, 13, 61, 74. After the de-
fault, defendants solicited bids from plaintiff and other 
contractors for completion of the construction work left 
unfinished. Id. at 61, 105. Defendants hired John 
Sevier as their agent to solicit bids and make recommen-
dations. Id. at 306. 
n2 American Insurance Company is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Company. The two companies are referred to col-
lectively as "defendants" throughout this opinion. 
As part of the bidding process, [*3] defendants sup-
plied the bidders, including plaintiff Triax, with a writ-
ten Invitation for Bids. Id. at 76, 106. The Invitation 
for Bids provided that a "contract for completion will 
be entered into between the successful bidder and the 
Surety." Id. at 106. It further provided that any bid 
would be subject to approval of the Navy. Id. 
Plaintiff submitted its written bid prior to the bidding 
deadline but later withdrew the bid when it discovered 
an $ 800,000 error. Id. at 61, 112-13. On October 5, 
1990, defendants' agent Sevier wrote defendants indi-
cating that even if the error were accounted for, plaintiff 
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would have been the low bidder. Id. at 114. 
On October 30, 1990, Mr. Sevier telephoned Robert 
Christiansen, plaintiffs vice president. According to 
Mr. Christiansen's deposition testimony, their conver-
sation proceeded as follows: 
John Sevier called me up and said: "How would you 
like to go to work in Guam?" 
And I said, T d love to." 
He says: "Will you take it at the price you have sub-
mitted?" 
And I said: "What price?" 
And he said: "Your corrected bid with the eight hun-
dred thousand." 
And I said: "Yes, we'll take the job at that price." 
Id. at[*4]405. Mr. Sevier then stated "the job is yours, 
providing you can go out there to the government and 
prove to them that you are a competent contractor . . 
. .By the way, they are deleting the SSP credit. Please 
do a credit proposal for that to submit to the Navy when 
you get there." Id. at 522. Plaintiff alleges that during 
this conversation, Mr. Sevier also promised to tender 
plaintiff to the Navy as completion contractor. Id. 
Also on October 30, 1990, Mr. Sevier sent a fax to 
Mr. Christiansen requesting that plaintiff be prepared to 
respond to the Navy's correspondence deleting certain 
Specialized Supplemental Personnel from the comple-
tion contract at the meeting to be held in Guam. Id. at 
118. Mr. Christiansen prepared an estimate for con-
tract modification showing a credit of $ 233,604 toward 
plaintiff s previously-submitted bid amount. Id. at 121, 
211-12. 
On November 3, 1990, plaintiffs representatives, 
including its president, accompanied Mr. Sevier to 
Guam. Id. at 62, 79. Mr. Sevier also invited rep-
resentatives of another contractor; International Bridge 
Corporation/Western Alaska Contractor!, to travel to 
Guam at the same time. Id. at 70, 179. On November 
[+5] 5, 1990, plaintiff presented its qualifications to the 
Navy in Guam. Id. at 63, 
During the November 5 meeting, the Navy's represen-
tative, Mr. Putnam, explained that defendants had three 
options for dealing with RG & B's default: (1) com-
pleting a takeover contract with a contractor, (2) doing 
nothing and allowing the Navy to reprocure the project; 
or (3) tendering a contractor to die Navy. Plaintiffs 
representatives were informed that defendants had not 
yet selected an option and the Navy could not proceed 
in drafting a contract with an acceptable contractor until 
they did so. Id. at 202-03. 
Mr. Sevier did inform the Navy representative that de-
fendants wanted to tender plaintiff as replacement con-
tractor. Mr. Sevier further requested that plaintiff be 
allowed to inventory materials stored by RG & B. Id. at 
63, 102. A Navy representative accompanied plaintiffs 
representatives to the jobsite where they began an inven-
tory. Id. at 63, 202, 217. Representatives of Western 
Alaska Contractors also performed an inventory of the 
jobsite. Id. at 79. 
On November 5, Mr. Sevier also requested a "best and 
final offer" from both plaintiff and Western Alaska. Id. 
at 79. [*6] Plaintiffs representatives objected that they 
believed they already had been awarded the contract. 
Mr. Sevier was apologetic but explained that defendants 
wanted him to obtain new bids. Id. at 329-30. Plaintiff 
Triax presented a revised, verbal bid of $ 10,869,000 in 
exchange for the deletion of certain inspection work on 
the project. Id. at 63-64, 71, 181,217. Wsstern Alaska 
also provided a new bid in the amount of $ 10,996,000, 
but indicated that they might further reduce their bid to 
$ 10,769,000. Id. at 70, 134-35. 
After receipt of the plaintiffs best and final offer; 
Mr. Sevier again told plaintiff s representatives that they 
were the low bidder and would be signing a contract with 
the Navy. Id. at 64, 181, 218. Mr. Sevier requested 
that the representatives meet with the Navy again on 
November 7. Id. at 64. On the morning of November 
7, 1990, plaintiffs representatives met with Mr. Sevier. 
He presented them with a bottle of champagne and told 
them they were the recipients of the contract. Id. at 
64-65, 207-08, 218-19. He also stated that the only re-
maining step would be to obtain the approval of, and 
sign a contract with, the Navy. Id. at 208, [+7] 219. 
Lata- that day, plaintiffs representatives met with Mr. 
Sevier and Mr. Putnam of the Navy. The meeting did 
not go as expected because Mr. Putnam indicated he 
had just received a letter from Mr. Seidl, defendants' 
counsel, in which defendants had elected to have the 
Navy reprocure the project rather than selecting the re-
placement contractor themselves. Id. at 129-30, 182, 
333-34. Mr. Putnam told the parties that he believed it 
would be necessary for the Navy to obtain new bidding 
due to the reprocurement Id. at 222, 452-53. What 
was said next is a matter of some dispute, but plaintiffs 
representatives left the meeting without an agreement by 
the Navy to accept plaintiff as replacement contractor. 
Moreover, Mr. Putnam testified that there was no rea-
sonable way that the Navy could have signed a contract 
at that point in any event The takeover contract had 
not been prepared. The Navy was still working on draft 
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language for the release and exoneration agreement to 
be entered into between the Navy and the defendants. 
There were still problems with the specifications which 
needed to be discussed. Id. at 231-32. (In fact, the 
completion contract was not finalized until [*8] January 
1991. Id. at 302.) 
Plaintiffs representatives left Guam and returned to 
Utah. They decided to contact defendants directly 
to "find out what the problem was." Id. at 320. 
Plaintiffs president called George McCarthy, the man-
ager of defendants' San Francisco surety claims office, 
on November 12, 1990. Mr. McCarthy indicated there 
must have been some confusion and reassured him that 
plaintiff would be tendered to the Navy. Id. at 58, 65, 
224. 
Plaintiffs representatives met with representatives of 
the defendants on November 14,1990, in San Francisco. 
They contacted Mr. Putnam, the Navy representative, 
by speaker phone. Mr. Alexander, defendants' senior 
surety supervisor, identified plaintiff Triax as the con-
tractor defendants wanted to tender to the Navy during 
this conversation. Mr. Putnam agreed to accept plain-
tiff upon receipt of written confirmation. Id. at 57-58, 
65-66, 246. 
Subsequent to the meeting on November 14, 1990, 
plaintiff was requested to submit a written commitment 
reflecting its best and final offer and the other terms dis-
cussed in Guam, which it did on November 16, 1990. 
Id. at 66, 141, 226. The commitment included the cost 
of curing [*9] items on a list of defects which was shown 
to plaintiffs representatives on November 7, 1990, in 
Guam. Id. at 142. The list included a revised credit for 
deletion of a special inspection program in the amount of 
$ 385,000, which had been discussed during the Guam 
trip. Id. 
Defendants replied to the commitment letter on 
November 21, 1990, objecting to some of its terms as 
non-conforming to die bidding instructions. R. at 66, 
143. Defendants indicated that they had received con-
forming proposals in die interim and that all current 
proposals would be considered. Id. at 144. 
Defendants wrote plaintiff on December 5, 1990, stat-
ing plaintiff would have to lower its bid or not be eligible 
for the contract Id. at 66. Plaintiff refused to lower 
its bid. ML Sevier recommended to defendants that 
they use Western Alaska because of its lower bid. Id. 
at 301. Defendants gave Western Alaska written no-
tice of acceptance of their bid and tendered them to the 
Navy on January 18, 1991. Id. at 72, 175-76. Plaintiff 
Triax brought this action alleging breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel theories. 
II 
As a threshold matter, defendants challenge our juris-
diction to consider [*10] plaintiffs appeal. 
Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal on March 29, 1994, 
thirty-two days after the entry of summary judgment and 
twenty-seven days after the magistrate judge assigned to 
hear pretrial matters denied plaintiffs motion to amend 
its complaint to state a cause ofaction in tort. Defendants 
contend that plaintiffs appeal from the order granting 
summary judgment was untimely. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss is clearly without 
merit. Plaintiffs notice of appeal was not untimely; 
it was premature. The summary judgment order did 
not dispose of the defendants' counterclaim. An order 
becomes final and appealable only when it ends the liti-
gation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment. See Mm Cauwenberghe u 
Biard, 486 US. 517,521-22,100L. Ed. 2d517,108 S. 
O. 1945 (1988); 28 US.C. 1291. Defendants' counter-
claim was voluntarily dismissed on December 1, 1994, 
after notice from this court of the apparent prematurity 
of the appeal. Once this counterclaim was dismissed, 
Triax's premature notice of appeal ripened and a new 
notice of appeal was unnecessary. See Lewis u RE 
Goodrich Co., 850E2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988)(dia-
cussing procedure where premature [+11] notice of ap-
peal is filed). It is of no moment that the premature 
notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the 
order granting summary judgment was entered. n3 
n3 Moreover, the summary judgment order was 
also not final so long as Triax's motion to amend its 
complaint rwnained outstanding. Triax did not prop-
erly object in the district court to the magistrate's 
denial of its motion to amend. For this reason, we 
cannot consider die merits of Triax's appeal from 
the magistrate's order. See In re Griego, 64 E3d 
580, 583 (10th dr. 1995Xp%xty waives objections 
to magistrate's order not presented to district court). 
However, die existence of the pending motion before 
the magistrate prevented the order granting summary 
judgment from becoming final for purposes of ap~ 
peal. 
m 
We turn now to the merits of plaintiffs appeal. "We 
review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same legal standard used by the district 
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Ingels v. Thiokol 
Corp. [*12] , 42 E3d 616, 620 (10th Cir. 1994){c\l-
ing Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. u First Affiliated Sec., 
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Inc., 912 Eld 1238,1241 (10th Cir. 1990)). "Summary 
judgment is appropriate if 'there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Hagelin for 
President Comm. v. Craves, 25 E3d 956, 959 (10th 
Cir. 1994Xqoo6ng Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), cert, de-
nied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 880, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). 
A 
The first count of plaintiffs complaint seeks damages 
for breach of an oral contract to award the construction 
contract to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that this con-
tract was formed during the telephone conversation be-
tween John Sevier and Robert Christiansen on October 
30, 1990. n4 
n4 The record does not clearly reflect the district 
court's basis for granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on this count of plaintiffs complaint. 
The court's minute order states that it granted sum-
mary judgment on Counts I and m because it "found 
no cause of action." R. at 569. Nevertheless we 
can affirm a trial court's entry of summary judgment 
upon any basis which appears of record. Jones v. 
Unisys Corp, 54 E3d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1995). 
1*13] 
Defendants argue the alleged contract is barred by the 
statute of firauds. Defendants further contend that there 
was no "meeting of the minds" sufficient to form a bind-
ing contract We need not reach the issue whether the 
purported contract falls within the statute of frauds be-
cause we agree that no binding contract was formed un-
der the facts presented. 
Under Utah contract law, a construction hid consti-
tutes an offer which, if unconditionally accepted, forms 
a binding contract RJ. Dam Omttr. Co. u Child, 
122 Utah 194, 247P.ld817,819 (Utah 1952). Such ac-
ceptance "requires manifestation of unconditional agree-
ment to all of the terms of die offer and an intention to 
be bound thereby." Id.; see also Col Vbdsworih Constr. 
v. City of St. George, 898 Rid 1372, 1376 (Utah 
1995). If such terms have not been completely agreed 
upon, however, or will not be final until memorialized 
in writing, there is no contract: 
If the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it being ap-
parent that die determination of certain details is de-
ferred until die writing is made out; or if an intention 
is manifested in any way that legal obligations between 
the parties shall be deferred until die writing [+14] is 
made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do 
not constitute a contract. 
Daum, 247 P. 2d at 820, quoting Restatement of 
Contracts 26, cmt. a. See also Cessna Fin. Corp. 
v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978)(no con-
tract formed unless there is a meeting of the minds as 
to all of its essential terms); Engineering Assocs., Inc. 
v. Irving Place Assocs., Inc., 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 
1980)(omi8&ion of material terms prevents formation of 
contract, and if contracting parties make it clear that they 
do not intend that there should be legal consequences un-
less and until a formal writing is executed, there is no 
contract until that time); Crismon v. Western Co. ofN. 
Am., 742 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah App. . / ^ ( p r e l i m i -
nary negotiations do not form contract). 
Here, plaintiff Triax withdrew its bid. Rather than so-
liciting a new bid, defendants made a direct counteroffer 
to plaintiff for completion of the project. However, the 
Invitation for Bids clearly contemplated that any such 
contract for completion would be in writing. Plaintiff 
could not reasonably have believed that Mr. Seviar's 
oral statements alone constituted agreement as to all ma-
terial terms of the [*15] construction contract. There 
remained many items to be resolved, most notably the 
credit to be given for deletion of the specialized sup-
plemental personnel and the identity of the contracting 
parties (i.e., whether plaintiff would be contracting with 
defendants or directly with the Navy). Negotiations con-
tinued during November 1990 and broke down after that 
time. 
Once negotiations broke down with plaintiff, defen-
dants were free to accept an offer from a competing 
bidder. 
When bids are solicited and are sent in for simultane-
ous opening, or for consideration all together, a bidder 
should usually be held reasonable in supposing that a 
bid is rejected as soon as one of the competing bids is 
accepted. But a mere notice of acceptance may not have 
any operation in this latter case, for the reason that a for-
mal written contract is contemplated. It has been held 
that each bid remains open for acceptance for a reason-
able time so long as no contract with a competing bidder 
has actually been consummated. 
J. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts 3.41 (2d ed. 1993) (em-
phasis added). 
It is unditpyfrd that plaintiff Triax continued the ne-
gotiating process by submitting a subsequent "best [+16] 
and final offer," that plaintiffs attempted written memo-
rial of these terms was rejected by defendants as non-
conforming, and that plaintiff never signed the contem-
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plated written contract with the defendants or the Navy. 
We conclude that no valid, binding construction contract 
was formed between plaintiff and the defendants as the 
result of the conversation of October 30, 1990. The dis-
trict court properly entered summary judgment on the 
first count of plaintiffs complaint. 
B 
The second count of plaintiffs complaint alleges the 
formation of a contract on November 7, 1990, after 
plaintiff submitted its best and final offer. R. at 6, 27. 
This count is styled "Breach of Contract Arising from 
Oral Solicitation, Oral Modifications of Solicitation, 
Offer and Acceptance." However, the district court gen-
erously construed this count, at plaintiffs request, to 
allege the breach of a contract to tender plaintiff Triax 
to the Navy as replacement contractor. Id. at 607. For 
this reason, we likewise analyze Count II on a contract 
to tender theory only. 
Wfe agree with the district court that this alleged con-
tract also fails because plaintiff gave no valid consider-
ation for defendants9 promise [*17] to tender plaintiff 
to the Navy and because there is no evidence of a meet-
ing of die minds sufficient to form the alleged contract 
to tender. Defendants admit having promised to tender 
plaintiff to the Navy. However, to constitute considera-
tion for a binding contract, the promise must have been 
"bargained for" by plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts 71 (1981). It is clear from the evidence of 
record that plaintiffs bid, its best and final offer, and 
the negotiations which resulted therefrom, were entered 
into in the hope of winning the construction contract, 
and were not bargained for consideration for the alleged 
promise to be tendered to die Navy. Any promise to 
tender was merely gratuitous. See Zoby v American 
Fidelity Co., 242 E2d 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1957). 
For die same reason, there was no "meeting of the 
minds" sufficient to form the alleged contract to tender. 
Moreover, there waa also no contract formed based on 
submission of a lwieed bid. TVs Invitation for Bids 
made any such contract subject to approval by the Navy. 
The Navy never gave ita approval. Under the circum-
stances, die parties' preliminary negotiations did not lead 
to contract formation. [+l%] See Cessna Fin. Corp., 622 
P.2dat787. 
Wfe have carefully reviewed the evidentiary materials 
cited by plaintiff as supporting its contention that the 
promise to tender waa part of an oral contract WD have 
been hindered, however; due to inaAvpiaf* record cita-
tions. (In several critical instances, citations are grossly 
overincluaive, such as citing over 90 pages of deposi-
tion testimony in support of a single factual assertion.) 
However, our review of these materials confirms the 
conclusion of the district judge that the promise to ten-
der "did not contain the material terms necessary to con-
stitute a binding, enforceable contract." R. at 638. 
For these reasons we are persuaded that summary 
judgment for the defendants on the second count of the 
complaint was correct. Ws have also considered other 
arguments related to this claim and find that they lack 
merit. 
C 
In the third and final count of its complaint plain-
tiff Triax avers a promissory estoppel claim. It alleges 
that it reasonably relied to its detriment on defendants' 
promises. More specifically, plaintiff says it refrained 
from bidding on other jobs and incurred costs of travel-
ing to Guam and preparing to perform the construction 
work [*19] for defendants. 
Utah has adopted the test for promissory estoppel 
contained in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90 
(1981). See Tblboe Constr. Co. u Stoker Paving A 
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984). The 
Restatement requires that a plaintiff prove three elements 
for such a promissory estoppel claim: 
I The promise must be one which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on die part of the promisee; 
2. The promise should induce such action or forbear-
ance; and 
3. Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has further promulgated 
a set of factual prerequisites for a promissory estoppel 
claim, as follows: 
that the defendants were aware of all the material facts; 
that in such awareness they made the promise when they 
knew that the plaintiff was acting in reliance on it; that 
the latter; observing reasonable care and prudence, acted 
in reliance on the promise and got into a position where 
it suffered a lose. 
Tblboe, 682 P.2d at 845-46. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is resorted to only 
where circumstances are such that equity and good con-
science render its application imperative [+20] in order 
to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice. . . . The 
promise or representation relied on must be sufficiently 
definite and certain that the plaintiff acting as a reason-
able and prudent person under the circumstances would 
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097, *20 
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be justified in placing reliance upon it; and in case of un-
certainty or doubt the responsibility is upon the plaintiff 
to ascertain the facts before acting upon it. 
P&tyv. GindyMfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 R2d 
30, 32 (Utah 1965) (footnotes omitted). 
Plaintiff, in response to defendants' interrogatories, 
asserted that the promise on which it relies was made on 
November 7, 1990, when Mr. Sevier informed plain-
tiffs representatives that Triax was the recipient of the 
contract and would be tendered to the Navy. However, 
the alleged promise to tender plaintiff to the Navy cannot 
form the basis for promissory estoppel based upon the 
criteria outlined above. That promise was made within 
the context of the process of negotiating the construction 
contract, which would not be binding until the written 
document was signed, for the reasons outlined above. 
Under the circumstances, any promises made were part 
of preliminary negotiations and could not form the basis 
[*21] for a claim of promissory estoppel. Cf. Lavoie v. 
Sqfecare Health Scrv., Inc., 840 P. 2d 239, 249-51 (Wyo. 
1992)(*pp\y'mg 90 promissory estoppel principles). The 
undisputed facts and circumstances here show that as the 
promisor, defendants would not reasonably expect ac-
tion or forbearance by Triax until a written contract was 
consummated. Thus the plaintiff failed to show that its 
reliance on statements of defendants or their agent was 
reasonable. Id. at 250-51. 
IV 
The judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah is affirmed. 
Entered for the Court 
William J. Holloway, Jr. 
Circuit Judge 
ADDENDUM B: 
Citation of Unpublished Opinions/Order and Judgments 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37746: 151 F.R.D. 470 
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151 F.R.D. 470 printed in FULL format. 
IN RE: CITATION OF UNPUBUSHED OPINIONS/ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS 
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37746; 151 F.R.D. 470 
November 29, 1993, Filed 
JUDGES: [*1] Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, and 
LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON, 
TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, 
Circuit Judges. 
OPINION: GENERAL ORDER 
By this General Order the court suspends 10th Cir. R. 
36.3 from January 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995, or 
until further order of court. While the rule is suspended, 
citation of unpublished opinions and orders and judg-
ments shall be governed by the following provisions: 
Unpublished opinions and orders and judgments of 
this court are not binding precedents, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collat-
eral estoppel. Citation of these unpublished decisions is 
not favored. Nevertheless, if it is believed that an un-
published opinion or order and judgment has persuasive 
value with respect to a material issue in a case and would 
assist the court in its disposition, that decision may be 
cited, provided that a copy of the decision is attached to 
the brief or other document in which it is cited, or, if 
cited in oral argument, is provided to the court and all 
other parties. 
During the pendency of this order, the court will eval-
uate the effectiveness of the provisions contained herein. 
The court invites interested parties to send written [+2] 
comments to the clerk of court. After evaluation, the 
court will decide whether the order should be vacated 
or its provisions should be incorporated into the rules of 
court. 
ADDENDUM C; 
Ernst's Objection to Introduction of 
Evidence Not Produced in Discovery 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter (5825) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
1 STATE OF UTAH 
F. C. STANGL, III, an 




ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. , a 
Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
ERNST' S OBJECTION TO 
INTRODUCTION OF 
EVIDENCE NOT PRODUCED 
IN DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
This is the damages portion of a lawsuit stemming 
from lease negotiations in 1988 between the Plaintiff, F. C. 
Stangl and the Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst"). 
Ernst moves the Court at this time to deny Mr. Stangl' s request 
to admit certain evidence allegedly relating to Mr. Stangl' s 
claims of damages because the documents and other evidence were 
not produced in response to Ernst' s discovery requests 
specifically requesting such information. 
199\49784 1 
Ernst has served Mr. Stangl with four sets of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents in 
this case. Ernst asked Mr. Stangl in each set of discovery to 
provide information regarding how he calculates his damages and 
to produce documents that he alleges support those 
calculations. In addition, Ernst asked Mr. Stangl to 
supplement his responses to its discovery requests as required 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On Saturday, February 19, 1994, at 6:00 p.m. Mr. Stangl's 
counsel hand delivered to counsel for Ernst a revised damages 
analysis document and what Mr. Stangl alleges are copies of 
checks he wrote to pay interest on a note in connection with 
acquiring property on which to construct an Ernst store. In 
Mr. Stangl' s revised damages analysis he alleges that he is 
entitled to damages for the amount he paid the prior owner of 
the property, Mr. Brockbank, to acquire the property plus the 
amount of interest he paid Mr. Brockbank for the promissory 
note signed for the property. Ernst specifically objects to 
information regarding interest paid on the Brockbank note 
because Mr. Stangl has not prior to this time included this 
item as an item of damage, nor has Mr. Stangl produced any 
documents related to such a claim. 
Ernst also objects to the admission of evidence concerning 
damages related to any "loss of a banking relationship" Mr. 
Stangl suffered as a result of any conduct on the part of 
Ernst. No documents or other evidence have been produced to 
Ernst explaining the basis of this item of damage or how Mr. 
Stangl proposes to calculate such damages. 
Ernst specifically asked Mr. Stangl to explain his damage 
theory and to produce checks and other documents backing up his 
claim for damages in each set of discovery that was served to 
his counsel in this case. The questions propounded by Ernst 
are as follows: 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET QF INTERROGATORIES 
AND SECOND DOCUMENT REQUESTS 
(answered October 5, 1989)(attached hereto as Exhibit A): 
Interrogatory No. 26: If you claim any item of damages 
whatsoever not described in response to any of the preceding 
interrogatories, please state the factual basis for each and 
every other item of damage you claim against Ernst. In 
response to this interrogatory, please also identify each and 
every other document not identified in response to any of the 
preceding interrogatories which contains any information 
whatsoever regarding your damage claims against Ernst. Also, 
in preparing for this interrogatory, please state all facts 
upon which you rely to support your contention that the damages 
described in response to this interrogatory were caused by 
Ernst. 
--. A 
Request No. 9: All documents Stangl relies upon to 
support his damage claim or any part of his damage claim as 
alleged in the Complaint. 
Request No. 10: All documents which support Stangl' s 
damage claim and/or show how Stangl has calculated his damage 
claim against Ernst. 
DEFENDANT' S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO 
THE SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY AND DEFENDANT'S THIRD 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND THIRD DOCUMENT REQUEST 
(answered July 20, 1992)(attached hereto as Exhibit B) 
(Mr. Stangl's General Objection to Request to Supplement): 
Mr. Stangl objects to Ernst's request to supplement as follows: 
"Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his 
possession responsive to all discovery requests and the 
information requested has been the subject of deposition 
testimony of witnesses for both parties and defendant has had 
ample opportunity through discovery in this matter to obtain 
the information sought". 
Interrogatory No. 3: Have you prepared or had prepared 
any report which purports to calculate the alleged damages that 
you claim to have suffered as a result of the actions by Ernst 
at issue in this lawsuit? If so, please identify the report by 
date and title, identify the person who has calculated those 
damages, the person who wrote the report, the amount of the 
damages as calculated, and the factual basis for those 
calculations. 
Interrogatory No. 5: How do you calculate your damages? 
Please identify all documents which evidence the means by which 
you have calculated your damages stated in response to this 
interrogatory. Also, please identify by name, home address and 
telephone number all persons who you will call or who you may 
call to testify about your alleged damages. 
Interrogatory No. 6: Please state in reasonable factual 
detail every act or forbearance to act that you did in reliance 
on the Ernst alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South 
and Redwood Road. Also, please state the dollar amount you 
claimed to have been damage with respect to each act, or 
forbearance to act, identified by you in response to this 
interrogatory. 
Request No. 1; Please identify and produce to counsel for 
Ernst all documents described in the Third Set of 
Interrogatories from Ernst to Stangl or identified in any of 
your responses to any of those interrogatories. 
ERNST'S FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND FOURTH DOCUMENT REQUEST 
(Answered December 7, 1992)(Attached hereto as Exhibit C) 
(Mr. Stangl's General Objection to Request to Supplement): 
Mr. Stangl objected as follows: "Plaintiff has provided 
all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to 
all discovery requests and the information requested has been 
the subject of extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for 
i both parties and defendant has had ample opportunity through 
I discovery in this matter to obtain the information sought. " 
j Interrogatory No. 2: For each such act that you alleged 
constitutes "part performance" state the following ... ." 
Mr. Stangl responded, "counsel also provided the documents 
wherein Stangl purchased the building and property in 1988. 
i 
Such documents contain the information relating to the purchase 
which only took place because of the agreement with Ernst". 
Interrogatory No. 13; Please supplement all previous 
discovery, both interrogatories and requests for production, no 
later than December 4, 1992. If you fail to supplement or 
produce documents, defendant will move at trial to exclude any 
information or documents which are responsive to these 
interrogatories or previous interrogatories and requests for 
production. 
ERNST' S FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUEST 
(answered January 13, 1994)(attached hereto as Exhibit D) 
Interrogatory No. 1: Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, please supplement your responses to 
Ernst' s Interrogatories and Request and for Production of 
Documents. If you have no new facts or information responsive 
to previous discovery requests, please expressly so state. 
Interrogatory No. 5: Have you prepared or had prepared 
any report which proports to calculate the alleged damages that 
you claim to have suffered as a result of the actions by Ernst 
at issue in this lawsuit? If so, please identify the report by 
date and title. Identify the person who has calculated those 
damages, the person who wrote the report, the amount of the 
damages as calculated and the factual basis for those 
calculations. 
Interrogatory No. 7: How do calculate your damages? 
Please identify all documents that evidence the means by which 
you have calculated your damages stated in response to this 
Interrogatory. Also please identify by name, home address and 
telephone number all persons who you will call or who you may 
call to testify about your alleged damages. 
Interrogatory No. 8: Please state in reasonable factual 
detail every act or forbearance to act that you did in reliance 
on the Ernst alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South 
and Redwood Road. Please include the date you began (including 
dates on which you committed to act) and the date you completed 
every act you identify in response to this Interrogatory. 
Also, please state the dollar amount you claim to have been 
damaged with respect to each act or forbearance to act you 
identify in response to this Interrogatory. 
Request No. 1: Please identify and produce all documents 
described in the Fifth Set of Interrogatories from Ernst to 
Stangl or identified in any of your responses to any of those 
Interrogatori es. 
Request No. 5: To the extent not already produced in 
response to prior document requests, please produce any and all 
documents upon which you relied to support any of the 
allegations in which you claim you are entitled to damages in 
this lawsuit. Please include check registers, ledgers, 
receipts and contracts negotiated with outside contractors that 
refer, reflect or relate to the amounts you claim as damages. 
Plaintiff responded generally "that his damage exhibit and 
all underlying documentation have already been produced to 
defendant ... [t]o the extent that plaintiff identifies any 
additional documentary evidence or any additional expert or lay 
witnesses in support of his damage theories, plaintiff will 
seasonably so inform defendant." 
ERNST HOME CENTER'S JANUARY 14. 1994 
LETTER TO STANGL 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit E) 
By letter dated January 14, 1994, counsel for Ernst 
stressed that "seasonably so informing" Ernst of additional 
evidence and witnesses that support Mr. Stangl' s damage claim 
would be now. " 
MR, STANGL' S FEBRUARY 18, 1994 LETTER 
TO ERNST 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit F) 
By letter dated February 18, 1994, counsel for Mr. Stangl 
informed counsel for Ernst that Mr. Stangl was planning to 
revise his damage calculations and would deliver the revised 
damage calculations on Saturday, February 19, 1994. 
FEBRUARY 19, 1994 LETTER FROM STANGL 
TO COUNSEL FOR ERNST 
(Attached hereto as Exhibit G) 
By letter dated February 19, 1994 hand delivered to 
counsel for Ernst at 6: 00 p. m. on this Saturday evening, Mr. 
Stangl provided Ernst Home Center with checks allegedly showing 
amounts Mr. Stangl paid as interest payments on a note to Mr. 
Brockbank, the former owner of the property. Mr. Stangl also 
produced a revised document setting forth his calculations of 
damages. This revised document stated "in addition, Mr. Stangl 
will testify as to the loss of the banking relationship." 
A trial court may refuse to admit evidence that is not 
provided to the opposing party in a timely manner. Hardv v. 
Hardv, 776 P. 2d 917, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Varhol v. 
PStiongl Rt fiT PfrSg?nger Corpt , 909 F. 2d 1557, 1566 (7th Cir. 
1990)(trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing ro 
admit document that a party did not submit to opponent before 
trial even where the document was omitted by mistake). 
Mr. Stangl's refusal to specify that he was claiming as an 
item of damage interest he now alleges he paid on a note to 
Brockbank and to produce documents related to such interest 
until Saturday evening during a holiday weekend before a trial 
starting on Tuesday must bar the admission of such evidence at 
trial. Similarly, Mr. Stangl' s complete failure to quantify or 
substantiate his clairr of a "loss of a banking relationship" as 
an item of damage must bar him from introducing such testimony 
now. Mr. Stangl' s failure to produce this information in 
response to Ernst' s discovery requests deprives Ernst of the 
ability to respond to, evaluate and analyze this information. 
For these reasons, Ernst respectfully requests the Court to 
refuse Mr. Stangl' s request to admit documents and testimony 
related to interest he alleges he paid to Mr. Brockbank and 
testimony related to any loss of a banking relationship he now 
claims. 
DATED this 22. 
day of February, 1994. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
j!/2ffX^ Ql4r/ I V W ^ I 
Elizabe/th Dolan Winter 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing Supplemental Trial Brief On 
Reliance Damages to be hand delivered this ^t? day of 
February, 1994, to the following: 
Stephen G. Crockett 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tab A 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766) 
Kenneth C. Johnsen, Esq. (A4605) 
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq. (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 53 2-784 0 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
) SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
I SECOND DOCUMENT REQUEST 
Civil No. 89-0202771CN 
Judge Michael Murphy 
I JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiff, Franz C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") , responds to 
Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories and Second Document 
Request as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES 
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 1: Stangl objects to the 
interrogatories insofar as they seek information not available to 
him at this time. To date, Stangl has not completed any discovery 
in this case. Stangl believes that many documents and witnesses 
STCL\034 wc 
seeks irrelevant and privileged information. Without waiving the 
foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 25 as 
follows: 
Yes. Stangl shall produce non-privileged documents which 
provide Ernst with the relevant information sought hereby. 
(a) Further to the response of Interrogatory No. 38, the 
amount of consideration paid to Mr. Brockbank by Stangl is 
reflected on the Option dated June 29, 1988 and produced herewith. 
There are no ongoing negotiations between Stangl and Mr. Brockbank 
concerning the subject property. 
(b) See documents identified in part (a) above and 
documents produced herewith-
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 6: If you claim any item of damages 
whatsoever not described in response to any of the preceding 
interrogatories, please state the factual basis for each and every 
other item of damage you claim against Ernst. In response to this 
interrogatory, please also identify each and every other document 
not identified in response to any of the preceding interrogatories 
which contains any information whatsoever regarding your damage 
claims against Ernst. Also, in responding to this interrogatory, 
please state all facts upon which you rely to support your 
contention that the damages described in response to this 
interrogatory were caused by Ernst. 
STCL\034.wc 
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see Appraisal Report of Jordan Valley Plaza dated March 8, 1988, 
Option dated June 29, 1988, and other documents produced herewith. 
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents Stangl relies upon to support 
his damage claim or any part of his damage claim as alleged in the 
Complaint. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Request No. 9 on the grounds that 
it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad and seeks privileged informa-
tion. Without waiving the foregoing objections, see documents 
produced herewith and Response to Interrogatory No. 21. 
REQUEST NO. 10; All documents which support Stangl's damage 
claim and/or show how Stangl has calculated his damage claim 
against Ernst. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Request No. 10 on the grounds 
that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad and seeks privileged 
information. Without waiving the foregoing objections, see 
documents produced herewith and Response to Interrogatory No. 21. 
REQUEST NO. 11: All documents signed by Ernst or any of its 
representatives upon which you rely to support your contention that 
a binding real estate lease has been formed between you and Ernst 
pertaining to the property described more particularly in the 
Complaint. 
RESPONSE: See documents produced herewith. 
REQUEST NO. 12: For the discovery period, all documents in 
the possession of Stangl, or any companies, partnerships, 
STCLV034 ve 
-68-
DATED this S day of October 1989. 
As to objections: 
As to responses; 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Stephen G. CropJCett, Esq. 
Kenneth C. Jcmnsen, Esq. 
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq. 
Attorney^ for Plaintiff 
STCL\034.vc 77-
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
F. C. STANGL, III, having been first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled 
action and that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents 
thereof to be true to the best of his knowledge, except as to 
matters stated upon information and Relief, and^ as to such he 
believes the same to be true. 
F. C.yjSTAMGLjlII 
A SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to bifore me X&XS 
Hdh^tS* J. 1989. ^ 
My•commission expires: 
Q ^u^^. 




GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
Stephen G. Crockett (0766) 
Carol Clawson (4813) 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation 
Defendant. ] 
1 ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO 
) SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO THE — 
) SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY AND 
I DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTER-
I ROGATORIES AND THIRD DOCUMENT 
I REQUEST 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
Plaintiff, F.C. Stangl, III (Stangl), responds to 
Defendant's Request to Supplement Responses to the Second Set of 
Discovery and Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories and Third 
Document Request as follows: 
REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT: Plaintiff objects 
to defendant's request to supplement on the grounds that the 
request is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery 
already taken in this case. Plaintiff has provided all non-
privileged documents in his possession responsive to all 
discovery requests and the information requested has been the 
subject of deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties and 
defenaant has had ample opportunity through discovery in this 
matter zo obtain the information sought. 
THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM ERNST TO STANGL 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES 
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 1: Stangl objects to the 
interrogatories insofar as they seek information that is (1) 
protected by the attorney-client privilege; (2) protected by the 
attorney work product privilege; (3) protected because it 
consists, in whole or in part, of trial preparation materials 
and/or documents containing mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of counsel; (4) otherwise protected 
under Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and/or (5) 
protected under any other valid privilege. 
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 4: Stangl objects to each and 
every interrogatory and document request including each and every 
definition and instruction, to the extent that and insofar as it 
attempts or purports to impose requirements or obligations on him 
beyond those imposed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 5: Stangl objects to the 
purported "Definitions" incorporated by defendant on the grounds 
that, in the aggregate, they are so complex, ambiguous, vague and 
burdensome that they create an unreasonable and undue burden upon 
-2-
been deposed, and to the extent they are in plaintiffs control, 
Stangl does not agree to make them available for any further 
deposition testimony except as may be reasonably necessary to 
testify to documents produced in conjunction with these 
responses. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Have you prepared, or had 
prepared, any report which purports to calculate the alleged 
damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of the 
actions by Ernst at issue in this lawsuit? If so, please 
identify the report by date and title, identify the person who 
has calculated those damages, the person who wrote the report, 
the amount of the damages as calculated, and the factual basis 
for those calculations. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 1. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Have you done anything to 
mitigate your damages? If so, please describe in reasonable 
factual detail everything you have done to mitigate the damages 
and the dollar amount of damages which you have mitigated, if 
any, between the date of the alleged breach and the date of your 
response. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on 
the grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of 
discovery already taken in this case. Plaintiff has provided all 
non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to this 
-5-
request and the information requested has been the subject of 
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties. 
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as 
follows: See the deposition testimony and attached exhibits for 
F.C. Stangl and S. Pruitt. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: How do you calculate your 
damages? Please identify all documents which evidence the means 
by which you have calculated your damages stated in response to 
this interrogatory. Also, please identify by name, home address 
and telephone number all persons who you will call, or who you 
may call, to testify about your alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory No. 1. In 
addition to the damages set forth in the report responsive to 
Interrogatory No. 1, Stangl suffered damages in the form of lost 
rental for 1989 and 1991, until the property was sold in March 
1991. That lost rental is calculated as follows: 
Ernst 
61,949 sq. ft. at $2.74 $169,740 per year 
Less expenses - 7% -11,882 
x two years 
North Shops - 16,915 so. ft. 
Rent w/Ernst - $10 sq. ft. 














Rent w/o Ernst - $7 sq. ft. $118,405 
Less vacancy - 15% 17,761 
Expenses - 7% 8,288 
I $ 92,356 
Difference $ 48,039 
Total Loss Rent S363,755 
Stangl will testify to the amount of these damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state in reasonable factual 
detail every act, or forbearance to act, that you did in reliance 
on the Ernst's alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South 
and Redwood Road. Also, please state the dollar amount you claim 
to have been damaged with respect to each act, or forbearance to 
act, identified by you in response to this interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 6 on the 
grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of 
discovery already taken in this case. Plaintiff is producing or 
has previously produced all non-privileged documents in his 
possession responsive to this request and the information 
requested has been the subject of deposition testimony of 
witnesses for both parties. 
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows: 
Pursuant to Rule 33(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiff is producing additional documents which provide 
information responsive to this interrogatory. See the deposition 
testimony and attached exhibits for F.C. Stangl and S. Pruitt. 
-7-
See also plaintiff's memoranda opposing defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please state all of the verbatim terms 
of the alleged "contract" that you want the court specifically to 
enforce against Ernst. In answering this interrogatory, with 
respect to each "contract" term listed by you, please also 
identify by date and author the written document allegedly signed 
by Ernst upon which you rely for your response. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 7 on the 
grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of 
discovery already taken in this case. Plaintiff has provided all 
non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to this 
request and the information requested has been the subject of 
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties. 
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows: 
See the deposition testimony and attached exhibits for F.C. 
Stangl and S. Pruitt. See also plaintiff's memoranda opposing 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
THIRD SET OF DOCUMENT REQUESTS FROM ERNST TO STANGL 
REQUEST NO. 1: Please identify and produce to counsel for 
Ernst all documents described in the Third Set of Interrogatories 
from Ernst to Stangl, or identified in any of your responses to 
any of those interrogatories. 
-8-
Plaintiff further objects on the grounds that the requests are 
unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already 
taken in this case. Subject to these objections, Stangl responds 
as follows: 
Plaintiff is producing in conjunction with service of these 
responses all non-privileged documents responsive to these 
requests that may not have been previously produced to the 
defendant. 
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ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO THE SECOND SET OF 
DISCOVERY AND DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND THIRD 
DOCUMENT REQUESTS was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of 
July, 1992, to: 
David A. Greenwood 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City. JlluZa^ 
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
Stephen G. Crockett (0766) 
Carol Clawson (4813) 
500 Kearns Bvoiding 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
F. C. STANGL, III , an ) ANSWER TO ERNST'S FOURTH SET OF 
individual, ) INTERROGATORIES, ERNST'S FOURTH 
) DOCUMENT REQUEST TO STANGL, AND 
Plaintiff, ) ERNST'S FIRST REQUEST FOR 
) ADMISSIONS TO STANGL 
v s . ) 
) 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., ) Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
a Washington corporation ) 
) Honorable Michael Murphy 
Defendant. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, F . C . Stangl, III (Stangl) , responds to Ernst 's Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories, Ernst ' s Fourth Document Request to Stangl, and Ernst ' s First 
Request For Admissions to Stangl as follows: 
REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT: Plaintiff objects to 
Defendants' Request to Supplement on the grounds that the request is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery already taken in this case. 
Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive 
to all discovery reques ts and the information requested has been the subject of 
extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties and defendant has 
had ample opportunity through discovery in this matter to obtain the information 
sought. 
FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM ERNST TO STANGL 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Specifically identify what act or acts of Stangl 
constitutes "part performance" of the lease contract you allege in this lawsuit. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 1 on the grounds that it 
is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this 
case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession 
responsive to this request and the information requested has been the subject of 
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties. 
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows: See response to 
Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: For each such act that you allege constitutes 
"part performance," state the following: 
a. Who performed the act; 
b . When the act was performed; 
c. The exact nature of the act; and, 
d. The cost or value of the act. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 2 on the grounds that it 
is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this 
case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession 
responsive to this request and the information requested has been the subject of 
- 2 -
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deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties. Plaintiff also objects to this 
interrogatory on the grounds that the response to this interrogatory may be 
ascertained from the business records of the plaintiff which have been produced 
to the defendant and that the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is 
substantially the same for the defendant as it is for the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
specifically refers to the documents produced by the plaintiff on July 20, 1992, 
which includes invoices for work done by Stangl in performance of the July 14 
agreement. Each invoice references a job number. Counsel for Stangl has also 
provided counsel for the defendant a Summary of Improvement Costs of Jordan 
Vedley which identifies all work performed in reliance on the July 14 agreement by 
job name and number and the total amount spent for each job number. This list is 
essentially an index to the invoices provided on July 20, 1992. Counsel also 
provided the documents wherein Stangl purchased the building and property in 
1988. Such documents contain the information relating to the purchase which 
only took place because of the agreement with Ernst. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State each and every term of the agreement by 
you to sell the Jordan Valley Plaza to Green Isle Development, including but not 
limited to forgiveness of debt on other transactions, assumption of debt, cash or 
other valuable consideration exchanged. Also, please describe any other 
agreements between you and Phillip Holland or Green Isle Development, whether 
related to the Jordan Valley Plaza or not, and whether in writing or not, that 
- 3 -
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as the subject of extensive briefing in response to defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please supplement all previous discovery, both 
interrogatories and requests for production, no later than December 4, 1992. If 
you fail to supplement or produce documents, defendant will move at trial to 
exclude any information or documents which are responsive to either these 
interrogatories or previous interrogatories and requests for production. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Defendants1 Request to Supplement on the 
grounds that the request is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery 
already taken in this case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in 
his possession responsive to all discovery requests and the information requested 
has been the subject of extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for both 
parties and defendant has had ample opportunity through discovery in this matter 
to obtain the information sought. Plaintiff i s , however, providing defendant with 
plaintiff's amended damage studies. 
FOURTH DOCUMENT REQUEST 
Request 1: Please produce all documents relied upon or identified in your 
response to the foregoing interrogatories and/or the following requests for 
admissions. 
RESPONSE: With the exception of the amended damage studies being 
supplied to defendant, plaintiff objects to Request No. 1 on the grounds that the 
m n 
- 8 -
the following Friday, but failed to do so. Instead Ernst wrote Stangl and 
informed him that they would not open an Ernst Home Center at the Jordan Valley 
Plaza because of information contained in a feasibility report initially prepared 
for Ernst in 1987. Ernst's refusal to open the center was unrelated to the terms 
of the lease. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and attached exhibits • 
REQUEST NO. 34: Please admit that the maintenance and repair work you 
did, if any, at the Jordan Valley Plaza in the Summer of 1988 is work that you 
would have done whether Ernst was going to lease from you or not. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this Request on the grounds that it is 
unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this case • 
Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive 
to this request and the information requested has been the subject of deposition 
testimony of witnesses for both parties. Subject to this objection, plaintiff 
responds as follows: 
Denies. See Response to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 and Response to 
Request Nos. 15 and 16. 
DATED this Q day of December, 1992. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER 
By. 
' ' Stephen G. Crockett ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
18411 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
F.C. Stangl, III being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read 
the foregoing Answer to Ernst's Fourth Set of Interrogatories, Ernst's Fourth 
Document Request to Stangl, and Ernst's First Request for Admissions to Stangl 
and that the same are true to the best of his k^ow)^d^^4^oxmatic«r^nd belief. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 
My Commission Expires: 9-6- n 
^XJx^^^UAXuriJL 
day of December, 1992. 
Notary Public \ * 
Residing atrX> / LSnjyi
 tf LTV 
NOTARY PUBUC 
KRISHCMRIOD 
36S3 S * * 6 * 6*Ct M 
Ptf * City. Ut tn M060 
My Commission Eiptrt t 
Stptsmosr 6.1994 
STATEOPUTAH 
u i UC-L J cbh 
J 
11411 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter (5825) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. , a 
Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
FIFTH SET OF INTERROGA-
TORIES AND FIFTH DOCUMENT 
REQUESTS FROM ERNST HOME 
CENTER, INC. TO FRANZ C. 
STANGL, III 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
Defendant, Ernst Home Center, Inc. ("Ernst") hereby 
propounds the following Interrogatories and Document Requests 
to the plaintiff, Franz C. Stangl, III, dba F. C. Stangl 
Construction Company ("Stangl"). Ernst requests that Stangl 
respond to the following Interrogatories and Document Requests 
under oath within the time authorized by Rules 33 and 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(3) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, please supplement your 
responses to Ernst' s Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents. If you have no new facts or 
199X45808 1 
information responsive to previous discovery requests, please 
expressly so state. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please identify each person 
answering or furnishing information used in answering these 
interrogatories and the following document requests. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please identify by name, home 
street address, and. telephone number all persons who you will 
call, or who you may call, to offer expert testimony at trial 
with respect to any issue in this lawsuit. With respect to 
each expert you identify in response to this interrogatory, 
please produce a copy of that expert' s curriculum vitae, state 
the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify 
and state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify. Also, please provide a summary 
of the grounds for each opinion that each such expert will 
offer. Also, with respect to each expert identified in 
response to this interrogatory, please identify any and all 
reports prepared for you in connection with this litigation by 
that expert. Also, please state whether you would be willing 
to voluntarily produce a copy of said reports to Ernst, and 
whether you will make that witness available for an oral 
deposition without a court order, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify by name, home 
street address, and telephone number every person who you will 
I99\4S808 1 
2 
call, or who you may call, as a non-expert (i. e. , lay) witness 
in the trial in this lawsuit. With respect to each lay witness 
you identify, please produce a copy of that person' s curriculum 
vitae if one exists for that person. Also please state the 
subject matter on which each lay witness is expected to 
testify, state the substance of the facts and opinions, if any, 
to which the lay witness is expected to testify, and a summary 
of the grounds for each opinion, if any, that the lay witness 
expects to testify about. Also, please state if you will make 
that lay witness available for an oral deposition without a 
subpoena-. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Have you prepared, or had 
prepared, any report which purports to calculate the alleged 
damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of the 
actions by Ernst at issue in this lawsuit? If so, please 
identify the report by date and title, identify the person who 
has calculated those damages, the person who wrote the report, 
the amount of the damages as calculated, and the factual basis 
for those calculations, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Have you done anything to 
mitigate your damages? If so, please describe in reasonable 
factual detail everything you have done to mitigate the damages 
and the dollar amount of damages which you have mitigated, if 
199X45808 1 
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any, between the date of the alleged breach and the date of 
your response. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7- How do you calculate your 
damages? Please identify all documents that evidence the means 
by which you have calculated your damages stated in response to 
this interrogatory. Also, please identify by name, home 
address and telephone number all persons who you will call, or 
who you may call, to testify about your alleged damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state in reasonable 
factual detail every act, or forbearance to act, that you did 
in reliance on the Ernst' s alleged promise to lease your store 
at 90th South and Redwood Road. Please include the date you 
began (including dates on which you committed to act), and the 
date you completed every act you identify in response to this 
interrogatory. Also, please state the dollar amount you claim 
to have been damaged with respect to each act, or forbearance 
to act, you identify in response to this interrogatory. 
FIFTH REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST KO. \\ Please identify and produce all 
documents described in the Fifth Set of Interrogatories from 
Ernst to Stangl, or identified in any of your responses to any 
of those interrogatories. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Please produce copies of all reports, 
if any, prepared for you by any persons who you will call, or 
199X45808 1 4 
who you may call, as an expert witness at trial in this 
lawsuit. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Please produce copies of all reports, 
if any, prepared for you by any persons who you will call, or 
who you may call, as a non-expert witness at trial in this 
lawsuit. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Please produce all documents in the 
nature of market studies undertaken by you or by persons 
retained by you, on the commercial property at 90th South and 
Redwood Road at issue in this lawsuit, between January 1, 1980 
and the date of your response to this document request. 
REQUEST NO. 5: To the extent not already produced in 
response to prior document requests, please produce any and all 
documents upon which you rely to support any of the allegations 
in which you claim you are entitled to damages in this lawsuit. 
Please include check registers, ledgers, receipts and contracts 
negotiated with outside contractors that refer, reflect, or 
relate to amounts you claim as damages. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Please produce all documents that 
reflect efforts by you, if any, to mitigate your alleged 
damages. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Please produce all income tax 




Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766) 
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359) 
Steven E. McCowin, Esq. (4621) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an 





ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation, 
Defendant. ] 
i PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO | FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
I AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUESTS 
I FROM ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. TO 
I FRANZ C. STANGL, III 
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
(Honorable Michael Murphy) 
Plaintiff Franz C. Stangl, III objects to the FIFTH SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUESTS FROM ERNST HOME 
CENTER, INC. TO FRANZ C. STANGL, III filed by defendant Ernst 
Home Center, Inc. on the ground that all such discovery is barred 
by the Court's Scheduling Order and Trial Notice dated November 
3, 1993- Plaintiff further objects on the basis of Rule 4-502(5) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which provides that 
all discovery must be completed "no later than thirty (30) days 
before the date set for trial of the case." The deadline set by 
rule 4-502(5) expired many months ago. 
Without waiving these objections, plaintiff responds 
generally that his damage exhibit and all underlying 
documentation have already been produced to defendant, and that 
Franz C. Stangl, III, is the only witness anticipated to be 
called in support of the damage claim. To the extent that 
plaintiff identifies any additional documentary evidence or any 
additional expert or lay witnesses in support of his damage 
theories, plaintiff will seasonably so inform defendant. 
Finally, plaintiff believes that the Court directed the 
parties to resolve certain foundational issues regarding 
plaintiff's damage theories and damage exhibits. Plaintiff 
stands ready to enter into appropriate discussions with defendant 
so as to resolve these issues in an expedited manner. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER 
& PETERSON 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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January 14, 1994 
VIA TELEFAX 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger 
136 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Stangl v. Ernst Home Center 
Dear Steve: 
I received your responses to Ernst Home Center, Inc. ' s 
discovery. You object to our discovery on several grounds, then 
go on to respond without waiving your objections. Because you 
did respond, we are assuming that if we brought a motion to 
compel production there is no additional information you would 
produce. If this assumption is incorrect, please let me know. 
You state that you will "seasonably so inform" Ernst if 
Mr. Stangl identifies any additional documentary evidence or any 
additional expert of lay witnesses in support of his damage 
theories. Steve, if is now January 14, 1994. The trial in this 
case begins in a little over one month, on February 22, 1994. 
"Seasonably so inform[ing]M Ernst of additional evidence and 
witnesses that support Mr. Stangl' s damage claim would be now in 
response to these discovery requests. Because you have not 
provided us with any such information, we are relying on your 
statement that you have produced to us all information in support 
of Mr. Stangl' s claims. We will oppose any effort by you to 
introduce at trial any documents, witnesses, or experts that we 
do not have or have not had an opportunity to depose at this 
time. 
199\4159? 
V A N C O T T , B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L & M C C A R T H Y 
Stephen G. Crocket t 
January 14, 1994 
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Very t r u l y yours , 
&ATffr*/ TV'" 'V r ' +*>' 
E l i z a b e t h Dolan Winter 
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STEVEN E M C C O W I N 
D O U G L A S H PATTON 
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WESLEY D FELIX 
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ROGER O SANOACK 
ROBERT D M O O R E 
KEVIN M MCOONOUGH 
OF COUNSEL 
February 18, 1994 
Hand-Delivered 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter 
Van Cott Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Re: Stanql v. Ernst 
Dear Elizabeth: 
Pursuant to my telephone conversation with Roger 
Kindley this afternoon, enclosed you will find Mr. Stangl's tax 
returns for the years 1988 through 1991. Please be advised that 
Mr. Kindley has stipulated that these documents shall be kept 
confidential and used only for the purpose of this trial. 
I anticipated also providing you this afternoon with 
revised versions of the damage exhibits which correct errors and 
omissions contained in prior exhibits. Due to my paralegal's 
illness and my inability to master some of the spreadsheet 
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VIA TELEFAX 
Stephen T. Hard 
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger 
136 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Stangl v. Ernst Home Center 
Dear Steve: 
I received your hand-delivered letter dated February 
18, 1994 at 4:30 p.m. today. You state that you had anticipated 
providing us with "revised versions of the damage exhibits which 
correct errors and omissions contained in prior exhibits" this 
afternoon. You state that because of the illness of your 
paralegal and your difficulty in using spreadsheet programs you 
will deliver such documents "sometime tomorrow morning." 
You will recall that we served Ernst' s Fifth Set of 
Interrogatories on you on December 10, 1993. In these 
interrogatories we requested you to supplement your responses to 
previous discovery, as you are required to do under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. We also specifically asked you to 
provide us with, among other things, any report that purports to 
calculate the alleged damages that you claim Mr. Stangl suffered 
as a result of the actions by Ernst; Mr. Stangl' s mitigation of 
those damages; how you calculate Mr. Stangl's damages; and all 
documents that evidence the means by which you have calculated 
damages. 
In your January 14, 1994 responses to these discovery 
request you objected to providing additional information and 
stated that you would "seasonably so inform" Ernst if Mr. Stangl 
identified any additional documentary evidence or any additional 
expert or lay witnesses in support of his damage theories. 
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Steve, the trial in this lawsuit is in three days — 
beginning on Tuesday after a holiday weekend. As I expressed in 
my January 14, 1994 letter "seasonably so inform[ing]M Ernst of 
additional evidence and witnesses would have been in response to 
our requests served on December 10, 1994. 
Because you did not provide us with information about 
any revisions you planned with regard to your damage analysis or 
exhibits, and because we have relied on your statement to us that 
you had produced to us all information in support of Mr. Stangl' s 
claims, we will oppose any effort by you to introduce at trial 
any documents, witnesses, or experts that we do not have or have 
not deposed. 
If you have any questions, please call. 
Very truly yours, 
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February 19, 1994 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter, Esq. 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Re: Stanql v. Ernst Home Center 
Dear Elizabeth: 
The purpose of this letter is to readily identify for 
you the corrections which have been made to the prior trial 
exhibits. These corrections are included in the new exhibits 
which we faxed to you today and which are enclosed herewith. All 
references to document numbers, unless otherwise noted are to the 
"SS" series. The changes are as follows: 
1. To the Gibson/GGGiant On-site improvement costs, a 
detailed examination revealed that checks for insurance payments 
(category 40) totalling $2,079 as reflected in document control 
nos. SS00000 534-36 were not included. Those have now been 
added. 
We have also added to the Gibson/GGGiant costs the 
amount of $160.00 which is shown on document control number 496, 
but which was not included in category 110 of the Job Cost 
Report. 
These changes required a redrafting of the summary 
sheet for the job costs for this project. 
2. With respect to the Firestone store, document # 565 
shows that $210 was not included in the job cost report, which 
has now been added to category 120 and to the summary sheet. 
3. With respect to the North Shops, category 400 is 
being increased by $375 which represents the check to R.L. Gines 
which we have been able to determine was expended for the North 
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Shops. Accordingly, line item no. 14 on Subpart "A" to trial 
exhibit 65 has been deleted and that amount is now included in 
the North Shop costs, the summary sheet for those costs and 
Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", line 24. 
4. With respect to Jiffy Lube, we have changed 
category 30 from $899.25 to $2,840 because document # 872 shows 
that the check was not properly coded, and we have determined 
through records from West Jordan that the entire $2,588 on 
document # 872 was for Jiffy Lube. Plaintiff's Exhibit 66E 
is the backup for this specific cost which is being transmitted 
herewith. 
We have attempted to carry-over these changes to 
wherever the numbers are included in other exhibits which have 
been provided to you. 
5. With respect to Exhibit 65, Subpart MB", we have 
changed slightly the methodology for the calculation of this 
number. More particularly, we have now disclosed to you on what 
we have identified as Ex. 65, Subpart "G", how we arrived at the 
value for the Firestone and Independent Testing Land. This 
change was made to provide a consistent methodology throughout 
the exhibits, whereas before there had been different valuation 
methods. 
6. Our prior exhibit 65, subpart "D" has been changed 
to provide the same methodology as discussed in paragraph 5 
above, and we have described the rent as being "annual" rent. 
7. Our prior exhibit 65 had a page entitled MIET & 
Firestone Interest Calculation." We have now included that same 
information in what we now identify as ex. 65- Subpart "E". To 
aid your and the court's understanding, we have also made 
reference to the source material from which those figures came. 
8. Our prior exhibit 65 had a page entitled 
"Allocation of Loan Reduction". We have simply included this 
same information in the document identified as Ex.65-- Subpart 
"F". 
Again, we have attempted to carry-forward this new 
information in whatever exhibits refer back to them. 
9. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", and its 
different versions, we have added a new line which should be 
identified as line 1A. This represents interest payments which 
were made by Mr. Stangl to the Brockbanks on the $250,000 note 
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which he gave them when he purchased the property in August, 
1988. The copies of the checks are compiled in a new Exhibit 66C 
which is being transmitted herewith. 
10. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart MAM, and its 
different versions, we have changed the number for line 8 to 
state correctly the amount of taxes paid as revealed in the 
backup documentation. 
11. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", and its 
different versions, we have changed line 16 to properly reflect 
the actual attorney's fees paid, as revealed in prior information 
provided to you. Roger has agreed to stipulate to the admission 
of the billing records for Kimball, Parr which we will identify 
as Exhibit 66D. 
As you can see, these changes are very minor, properly 
reflect expenses which were incurred in relation to the 
acquisition and/or development of the subject property, and 
should not be the subject of any claim of prejudice, surprise or 
the like. Further, much of this could have been resolved earlier 
if your firm or Roger had taken up the court's request and our 
numerous repeated requests to stipulate to the admission of Mr. 
Stangl's business records. The unwillingness to do so required 
us to do a detailed analysis of each record to see how it related 
to the job cost reports and the previous exhibits, all of which 
revealed the errors which have been corrected with the new 
exhibits. Given the significant volume of pages, the task was 
difficult and time-consuming. 
As you requested, I am hand-delivering to you hard 
copies of the new exhibits with this letter. In printing these 
documents previously, I cut-off a portion of Exhibit 65 which 
carried over the statement re loss of banking relationship which 
was in the prior Ex. 65. I also cut-off a portion of Ex. 65, 
subpart "A" (before and after 9/30) which included additional 
date references. I apologize. 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to 
contact me. , 
cm*-25966 
